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LAWRENCE KIMMEL 
NOTES ON THE ART OF MEMORY 
Memory believes before knowing remembers 
Believes longer than recollects 
Longer than knowing even wonders. 
      W. Faulkner, Light in August 
Let us go then, you and I  
when the evening is stretched out against the sky 
like a patient etherized upon the table. 
      T.S.Elliot, The Love Song of J.Alfred Prufrock 
 
A few years ago I was asked to write a piece for a memorial Festschrift for a friend and 
colleague who had just died. It occurred to me then that remembrance was a very special faculty 
of mind; this essay takes up the threads of that remembrance. The task of understanding memory 
is daunting: it is ubiquitous in every aspect of life and thought.  I will try to distinguish important 
features of memory as it functions in our individual and collective lives, but my primary concern 
is with a particular aspect of remembrance that is a creative resource vital to the lives of 
individuals and to stories of those lives in the literature of culture. 
 
I 
Memory is an essential aspect of all thought and feeling.  It is engaged and involved as a 
matter of course in each sentient moment of our lives.  Studies in neurophysiology and the 
science of memory investigate bio-chemical processes that account for different functions of 
memory.  Recently Barry Gordon (M.D., Ph.D., a professor of neurology and cognitive science 
at John Hopkins Medical School) in a coauthored book, Intelligent Memory, makes a distinction 
between „ordinary‟ and „intelligent‟ memory particularly in reference to the loss of memory that 
occurs with aging.  What we might call the ordinary labor of memory is employed in the 
recording and storing of data, a routine accumulation that constitutes the body and resource of 
 2 
mind that constructs a stable environment and supporting identity.  Mostly automatic and a 
matter of repetition and patterning, this activity is located in a relatively small hippocampus 
section of the brain most vulnerable to the atrophy associated with aging.  There is however, a 
different kind of memory that is a property of nerve cells located throughout the brain; this 
„intelligent memory‟ funds an activity that corresponds more to creative work than the routine of 
labor.  This aspect of memory represents a crucial resource of the mind as the residuals of routine 
memory fade, one that remains active as long as it is engaged in new activities of learning, a 
locus of memory vital to creative experience.  The creative work of memory in the re-emergence 
of the past breaks the routine of conscious experience, and in this capacity opens a domain of 
remembrance to which the poet has recourse in the appeal: “Speak Memory.”  Our interest in this 
essay has to do not with the science of the brain, but with the art of the mind—in the creative 
work of memory as it expands consciousness and restores creative possibilities for 
transcendence. 
The central issue of self-understanding in philosophy is also, of course, the understanding 
of life and world and other.  The world is my world in the peculiar sense that I am my world—
the world is the totality of my experience. But in an equally important and obvious sense it is not 
only my world—I am born into it, as I am born into a language and culture. In a no less puzzling 
sense, my existence is a presence, in a present that is a kairic moment in a continuous flow of 
experience in which all I have been leads up to and away from this moment.  Time and life is this 
flow, the current of existence that I am. 
The currency of memory in consciousness is widely discussed in the literature of 
phenomenology, but we will here be concerned less with the detailed structure of consciousness 
than in the special resource of remembrance that abides in the thoughtful individual and feeds the 
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poetic imagination.  Whatever the complexity of its structure, memory is a generative force in 
the natural history of human beings from oral cultures through the development and codification 
of literate discourse. The theme of memory has been an essential feature of literature from its 
first emergence in myth and ritual and the mnemonic gathering into epic in the formation of 
cultural identity.  In philosophical discourse, remembrance has been a central issue from its 
Hellenic beginnings to the recent renewal by Heidegger as essential to the authentic existence of 
human being as aletheia—un-forgetting.  Whether or not Socrates was right that the unexamined 
life is not worth living, reflection—the playing back of experience to oneself—is the first 
movement in understanding what is worth living.  The meaning of reflection requires the use of 
metaphor in both its process and description.  In terms of movement, reflection begins a journey: 
to think back, to think again, to think about my thinking, to examine the horizon of my mind, to 
remember are all part of  an adventure to search out the depth and detail of one‟s life.  The larger 
process of humanistic self-understanding can be understood through metaphor as a concern for 
Being through remembrance. 
The story of my life exists within the collective story of our lives; indeed, as many stories 
as can be imagined or remembered.  Memory and imagination are the creative confluence of 
these stories.  But in the metaphor of journey, where does one travel to in these cases of memory 
and imagination?  Memory is a present journey into past times and places in which we seem to 
constitute a separate world from the ordinary of continuing consciousness (as if that itself were a 
clear concept)—a world apart from the ongoing current of our lives.  We are continually doing 
this in an autonomic process, of course, constituting our lives reflectively with the invested 
meaning of past events and activities, people and places, hopes and regrets, procedures and 
projects. Our mutual lives and language embody the possibilities of our next encounter: we 
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constitute our lives in the things we do and do not do, within the framework of what we have 
done and left undone, in the relations we make and break, in the things we think, and choose, in 
the stories we invent about ourselves and each other, in what we remember and have forgotten. 
In the phenomenology of my everyday existence there is a natural order of things and 
events, a causal nexus of sight, sound, and motion that I think of as the world.  I am the focus of 
that causal order, as well as the center of an interpretive, rational order.  I think of this double 
order of things, causal and rational, only on occasion as my world, when something is ajar or 
amiss when the continuing current of existence is somehow broken.  I think the world as I live it, 
but also I can think about it, withdraw from it in thought, in reflection, in imagination, in 
memory.  This withdrawal is not so much a leaving of the ongoing natural world as a 
reconstituting of it, or of a parallel construction of a temporary world of fiction, or on occasion 
fantasy that in turn modifies the natural world to which I return—a lateral activity that 
continually occurs, serving to set out myriad possibilities that run in parallel as I consider some 
task or person or event. The emotional importance of taking time out from the driving current of 
expectations and obligations that otherwise control our lives, of letting go (“and letting God” as 
it is sometimes expressed among both devoteds and debunkers) is a commonly acknowledged 
therapeutic benefit, the waking equivalent of a dream. 
Empirical studies in neurophysiology and psychiatry have set out the mechanics and 
dynamics of brain and mind in the operation of ordinary remembrance, including clinical studies 
of pathology of Freud and others about traumatic remembrances of childhood.  Our concern, 
however, is not with causal processes or the how of memory, but with a preliminary analysis of 
the experience of remembrance independent of causal process or clinical remediation: the simple 
question of what do we remember, and why?  Very likely one kind of remembrance is simply the 
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memorable—not the traumas that scar the soul, but the good and bad together, the important 
junctures in our lives—turns in the road and roads not taken, roadside attractions, places we have 
stayed, places we have built or left, things we are proud of or regret—the mundane vitae of our 
ordinary but on reflection remarkable lives.  
There are common categories of description as well as peculiar or singular occurrences 
that a given individual will claim in thinking back on her life.  For example, both athletes and 
scholars, when invited, would likely begin by remembering early periods of life as a growing 
sense of competence and achievement, marking occasions of laurels and recognition. For those 
who have been to war, images of death and destruction, of comrades and chaos may be the stuff 
of remembrance and shared stories—or else be buried in repressive or dismissive alternatives.  
Those who are blissfully or tearfully married may remember a defining event in their lives—of 
commitment and optimism about an open future met together with another that fulfilled or failed 
in its promise. Those who have children will remember births, birthdays, broken hearts and 
bruised bones, the many faces of joy and disappointment as their children grew into themselves.  
Our remembered lives are all a patchwork; yet all of it somehow is the nurturing ground of our 
identity and continuance. 
  A common occasion and resource in the building of memory is the process and product 
of repetition: how much of our lives is taken up in the correlative activities that lead up to or 
follow from some event?  Psychologists study the familiar procedures that make up and take up 
so much of our conscious life in the correlative activities of rehearsing and debriefing. We seem 
to routinely enact elaborate rituals preparing to greet the faces that we meet—cognitively and 
emotionally, as well as cosmetically and sartorially—solitary run-throughs of what the day is 
likely to bring.  We get ready, practice, go-over, plan, preview, study, imagine, plot and project. 
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Later, after the fact, we similarly engage in a fictional debriefing; depending on how the 
interview, meeting, or engagement went, we tend in memory to think over, think through, repeat, 
re-hash, re-construct, reconsider, and otherwise correct and repair the episode in consciousness.  
In the process of such recollection, we can and do misremember, reinvent, change, and otherwise 
rearrange what happened to make ourselves in our own minds better, sharper, more intelligent, 
responsive, confident, successful…than perhaps we were in fact. 
Both facts and fictions thus constitute the ongoing process of our development as 
persons.  The fiction of memory may be one of self-reassurance, or more radically, re-
constitution.  The character of a person is developed through what she decides and does.  That is, 
actions have residuals not just in the world but in ourselves: actions become habit become 
character—they make up what we become.  But this becoming is also a matter of what we think 
about what we have done, what we reflectively index as part of a projected character.  How 
much of character, so constituted, is invention—the product of imagination and projections of 
fantasy—fictions of belief and remembrance?  We constitute ourselves and each other through 
what we do, chose, think, remember, imagine, through that to which we aspire, but also through 
that which we regret.  Guilt and shame are indelible and enduring marks of memory, for which a 
given place or person, unawares, may be the prompting. Dostoevsky‟s Fyodor Karamazov 
remarks that he once did a man a terrible injustice and that he has never forgiven the man for it.  
Memory can shift responsibility in perverse ways, but still exact its pound of flesh. 
 
II 
So far, we have been speaking of the process of memory, and of recollection as a journey. 
We can also inquire into the world of memory, and the same question occurs again: where is this 
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world and of what sort of world is it?   Where do I go to, remembering my childhood? I can 
review, and in some acute cases, re-live events of my life. And in such instances, we may be 
surprised at which ones present themselves at any given time—parts and pieces we somehow 
have indexed in our self-life-stories; as it were, footnotes in the annotated biography of our lives. 
Reflecting on this process, it seems very much a return in time to places once lived and now 
revisited.  What is the language in which we can make sense of this?  At such times it seems as if 
the mind is its own place, and of itself, can generate moments and images of what is past, of 
what had been forgotten, and provide a way to reach past places and times.  We recover the past 
in stories retold: of old times, and former places—markings and remarkings along the way. 
Here is a particular thought experiment; the detail of this remembrance is my own, but 
yours will not be so different: remember the house in which you were born and grew up.  The 
detail of the place—the door to the cellar, the smell of the kitchen, the dust of the coal bin, the 
lint of the laundry room, the grain on the wood doors in the hallway, the window looking out into 
the garden.  Remember the porch in summer, the neighbors gathered, talking in the darkening 
night air, fireflies blinking, mosquitoes biting; recall the feel of leaving for school on a Spring 
morning, the driveway with your father‟s car on the weekend; the leafless trees in winter, the 
sidewalk shoveled free of snow, the shouts of children on the playground in summer.  It is as if 
we move though a world still there, knowing full well it is not.  What is the nature of this 
experience, its meaning, and its possible effect on our continuing lives in remembrance?  We are 
likely less interested in the veracity of the experience, than in its emotional substance and effect.  
Remembrance seems to be a psychic resource of some worth in the simple fact of its continuance 
and availability.    
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It is a familiar experience to go as an adult back to a childhood home or place and remark 
how small it is; how large it had become in memory.  Some of the remembered places and 
people are long gone or no more—destroyed, overgrown, dead—and still they come to life in 
memory.  It is not untrue to remark that all the places of remembrance are dead and gone.  The 
photograph as “l’image du morte”  as pictures of those no longer—of my father, in a photograph 
once as a boy, that I look upon now that I am an old man, or in a similar sense, pictures of myself 
as a child.  There is a sense of the uncanny in looking at such photographs—looking at what we 
were, looking onto the hopeful eyes of the dead. 
This process of remembrance is not unlike reading a novel: deliberately initiated or not, 
we are drawn into a fictive world in which we live for awhile—which may indeed intrude upon, 
or detract from the “real” or natural world of our continuing lives.  People can be lost both in and 
lost to memory.  We say of such people that they “live in the past.”  Faulkner‟s characters come 
to mind here; the old woman recluse rumored to have been jilted by her lover as a girl, in “A 
Rose for Emily”, and more generally the whole fixation of cultural remembrance in Faulkner‟s 
stories of a dying Southern aristocracy. 
The familiar literature of clinical psychology often fixes the paradigm of remembrance in 
terms of pathology such that in extreme cases the line between what is real and imagined 
completely dissolves so that one is unable to clearly distinguish between past and present.  It is 
not surprising, perhaps, that in a less virulent form this also is a regular feature of literature, both 
in writing and reading—for example in the autonomic or willing suspension of disbelief, or the 
related process of a willing appropriation of fictive belief.  In literature, however, there is no 
special problem of reconnecting to the shared and public world of an ongoing present.  Plato was 
inclined to credit the poet with a singular faculty and access to the irrational that he called divine 
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madness; however in ordinary cases of madness that do not achieve divinity the line between 
what is real and what not is less acute and therefore less re-presentable as art.  For the pedestrian 
mad, if there is such a thing, the present and what has passed is simply blurred.  The point here is 
not that madness is a risk of intrusive remembrance, but the appeal of the past and the lapse into 
memory may share something with such cases.  If madness begins in a release from the solid 
insistence of a continuing time and place, sanity becomes, in the normal course of events, the 
constant recovery from continual excursions of imagination and memory.  However, some kind 
of fantasy life no less than the deep sleep of dreaming is apparently critical to the health of 
human life and mind.  Freud‟s theoretical structure of the person and personality in terms of 
three developmental stages are framed within three correlative principles: of pleasure, reality, 
and ideality.  As a moralist, Freud was concerned to advocate the health of a secure reality 
orientation, a development of ego-strength to govern the conflicting demands of id and super-
ego— the moderation and control of immediate gratification on the one hand and an anchor from 
the remove of abstraction on the other.  His intuition is that the self can be equally devoured in 
the immediacy of sense, or in the distractions of the ideal.  Even so, the health of the organism, 
no less than the person, seems to depend on such excursions—psychic breaks into the immediacy 
of sense, but also into the mediacies of fiction.  
 Our shared language constitutes a network of common sense and sensibility; a web of 
belief that supports both public and personal perceptions and relationships.  Memory connects 
with belief in the crucial sense that to believe that something is the case is to hold it in memory, 
and to hold to memory as a foundation and operational resource.  To believe in something or 
someone, is to hold in another way to a conviction, a trust stored in memory.  The current of 
consciousness exists on a grid of memory and belief that constitutes the self, world, and others.  
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The creative act of imaginative remembrance makes use of this grid to break with the present, 
with the ongoing continuance of what is before me, to disengage from the pressing insistence of 
world and time. 
 Philosophical interest in “the given” in traditional epistemology and ontology—as the 
root datum of experience, and as the primal ground of being—can be usefully extended to the 
context of memory in the continuance of person, community, and culture. In addition to what is 
given in perception there are resources of the given in memory, dreams, and imagination that 
have special access to the unconscious, which inform and transform consciousness in the 
contexts of culture. 
III 
 
 To fully understand the working of memory in the identity and continuity of a given life 
and culture is obviously a complex task that requires the perspectives of many disciplines, but 
the phenomenon of remembrance is also a simple experience common to every person, which 
provides a key to its significance.  In the simple matter of remembering myself, what is it that I 
do, and what is it that I bring to mind? The times and places and people, issues of the day, the 
hopes and regrets that were building then until now—all come to presence once again, in 
retrospect.   In such cases of deliberation, one begins always in medias res, and the time may be 
chosen arbitrarily.  Say, twenty years ago this summer: that would make it 1984. I was at Oxford, 
the children were in school at Radley college; we had a house from the college on the grange 
overlooking the upper reaches of the Themes river...  What I now select to remember is not only 
a function of who I am now, but what I am doing now in selecting—thinking about the process 
of remembering, remembering in order to examine the process and profit of remembrance. 
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If I give into the tug of recollection of 20 years ago, there are glimpses, for the most part, 
of a place—The Vicarage in Radley, a face of the Welsh Vicar, his ruddy cheeks, his kind 
uncertainty and gentle eyes, the concern in his voice as he begins the daily office of his late 
calling to the Anglican priesthood….but the image of my son at Radley college at that time 
intervenes in my recollection of the Vicar, and a mix of scholar gown and playing fields, the still 
acute horror of learning of his brain aneurism, the hospital visit, and Gaudy celebrated later on 
the pitch, cars gathered about with picnic baskets and blankets spread to watch the Cricket game, 
High table at Christ Church, Evensong in the Cathedral, an invitation to publish a journal piece 
recollecting my time with the philosopher O.K. Bouwsma. 
And in the process just now I remember that my father had just died.  Suddenly the years 
seem all to run together in ways that disrupt the intention of examining a particular time.  There 
are in memory times within times, a collusion of thoughts, images, feelings that have a life of 
their own, an insistence that I give into in reverie, or not.  Unwanted and intrusive feelings arise 
here—an illness that I have inherited, and passed on, my sense of loss, my wanting to remember 
my father earlier in his life, young and vital, decades younger than I am at the time of writing 
this.  To what end memory?  At the very least, something in me remains alive and returns to life 
in this process that is the gift of remembrance. 
In looking at one‟s own children as adults, now older than my first memories of my 
father when I think of him, memory is intimate and integral to this perception—one sees the 
knicks and scars of their adventures, sees through their present looks and lives to everything they 
have been.  These images and feelings granted by memory are an essential part of my continuing 
and changing perception of them. 
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The sense of one‟s life—what I do, what I am, with whom I am, both with others in the 
community and in the world to which I belong—is tangled in a web of memory   To remember 
my parents, who are now dead. To remember the birth of my children, now with children of their 
own. To remember the first day of school, my first date, first kiss, first car, first job….first 
everything: the memorable, what signals a formative event, made so by the decision to mark it as 
a defining moment or chapter in the building story of my life.  These are all kairic moments in 
the flux of time such that we date our consciousness of ourselves in the events. Not everything 
goes into memory, into the available resources of consciousness to be called on in times of self-
doubt, or occasions of reaffirmation.  Moments of sudden recollection in the sound of a song, the 
smell of a flower bring, undirected to conscious attention that moment in my life: lilacs in spring 
and the filling of May baskets for childhood friends in the old neighborhood; or at another time 
hearing the sound of the blues, I see and feel the wet night streets outside a club the name of 
which I no longer remember in Manhattan fifty years ago. 
There are common and shared historical moments in memory that serve to index both a 
time and cultural identity.  For a certain age of people, the question: “Where were you when you 
heard that Kennedy had been assassinated on the streets of Dallas?” is a significant way of 
connecting not only with an event in the past, but to a relationship with the asker in the 
continuing narrative of the present.  
Man is a storytelling animal, and the natural emergence of narrative in memory 
sometimes comes of its own—a sound, a smell, and I am back among things of childhood. 
Sometimes it comes with effort:  I want to remember when it was that I last met with a colleague 
who has just retired.  Or, as with the assassination of a president, it may become an automatic 
point of reference that when asked where I was when the planes hit the twin towers on 9/11, I 
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can say without thinking  “I was preparing for class in my office at the university, the department 
secretary, eyes wide in shock of disbelief came in to announce what was happening in New York 
City as if to confirm the reality of a world in which she no longer felt secure—and once again, in 
this process of remembrance, the mind leads away into a domain of details and images some real 
some second order electronic from the television of that moment and the ensuing day. The point 
in citing such remembrance is that when I recall some remembered time with only a few details 
or images the mind is so structured that it weaves them into a story, as much for myself as the 
questioner, of who and what and where, and when of the day and incident of “9-11”.  
What is it I “intend” in remembering the school, the hallways and classrooms of my first 
school experience?  Not each day, or a particular day; nor the exact shape of the building; rather 
there is a sense of the place, on a rainy day, of a soccer game played out on the sandlot in the 
spring, a game of tag years earlier in the snow at recess, of a boy who chewed his pencil into 
fragments, of a girl who insisted that I confess to grinding up an eraser in the pencil sharpener so 
that the class could be released from being kept after school until someone confessed (I had not 
done the deed, but she seemed so genuinely angry and so sure in her accusation that it still makes 
me wonder)…and now I think of that little girl—Patricia Westcott, which I recall because the 
brand name on the school ruler at that time was Westscott) whether I had ever talked with her 
before or after that accusation during those years in school—I don‟t think so—but here is the 
name and the child‟s face more than sixty years later.  I am quite sure this is not an invention of 
imagination—we were there, next to the water-fountain, standing on the soft cork of the hallway 
floors, on a sunny afternoon.  Someone finally must have confessed, or else the teacher wearied 
of it all and sent us all home with a reprimand about character, the wages of sin, and what will 
become of such evil doing.  There was no trauma in this, no repressed childhood memory that 
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needs exorcizing. No special reason to remember any of it; but there it is, long dead and half 
buried, but the gentle winds of memory strip away the years and all the things piled on…and 
now other memories come of those times, the “victory garden” in a field just up the way from the 
school, raising our own vegetables to help the war effort, I thought—and so I collected 
newspapers, aluminum foil, the flag with the service stars in my grandmother‟s window for her 
four sons somewhere in the military in a world at war, the evenings gathered among the women, 
my great aunt at the piano playing some of the songs from an earlier war, soft lights and soft 
conversations, hearing somehow in the whispering of women the sounds of war—I see the 
uncertain child I was, feeling once again the fear, the longing, the hope, the absence… 
And so it goes, a collage of sights and sounds, random pieces of a puzzle I may have no 
need to sort out or fit together, but there is a story and a life there, roots and remnants—
habitations of the heart and mind in the soft tissue of personal history.   
  
IV 
I awakened this morning in Prato, Italy. I am here to present a paper at an international 
conference on the future—seemingly dismal at times—of the Humanities.  It is a good question 
that seems not to be addressed, whether the future of humanity is somehow allied with the future 
of the Humanities: living beings enscripted with values which their disciplines more or less 
independently study and seek to shape. The Humanities constitute the collected memory of a 
sometimes comparative and conflicted cultural tradition in terms of which nations and peoples, 
independently or mutually, seek identification and continuance.  
 Coming to consciousness from an exhausted sleep, jet-lagged, my first effort is to 
remember where I am and what I am doing: I have awakened to memory.  This room becomes 
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familiar from last night, I remember the hallway, the elevator, the lobby, the clerk, the bellman, 
the elaborate Persian carpets in the lobby, and now a sense that the staff were all middle-eastern, 
and that the hotel is likely owned not by Italians but Arabs.  I remember the front of the hotel in 
the dark of night as the cab passed it by to make a u-turn to deposit me. I now remember that my 
baggage did not arrive with me, and that I will have to call the airport to see if they have yet 
arrived.  I remember the difficulty of registering at the airport with lost and found, the incredibly 
understaffed and inefficient process, standing in a queue of 25 people, all of whom arrived 
without luggage, all having intended to disperse into the outreaches of Northern Italy.  I recall 
the expression of anger and anxiety in the confusion and fusion of many languages as we 
endured the slow and individual remediation of our mutual inconvenience. My own anxiety now, 
in what I will have to do or buy to get by until the luggage arrives. I am aware of regretting, as I 
often have in the past as I now remember foresworn against, that I am traveling in a country 
whose language I barely manage.  And so on it goes, memory mixed into a cognitive 
reorientation to a place and time, a presence from which to meet the day. 
 Memory even in this common sense as a ready and ongoing source of appeal is not so far 
distanced from literature as a mediating resource of cultural identity and community.  Nabokov‟s 
autobiography is entitled “Speak Memory”, as if the faculty has its own energy and voice.  It is 
through the invitation to have memory speak that literature discovers the mediated reach and 
embodied domain of heart and mind.  The citation from Faulkner‟s Light in August at the outset 
of this essay suggests the existence of a more remote source of sight and insight in the appeal of 
remembrance, a pale light, not the fire of passion, but not the dead light of winter.  
Remembrance is a kind of light in August, an infusion of light and life from a season distanced 
from the spring of its origin. Faulkner‟s poetic remembrance is both collective and systematic 
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and of a studied and opaque character; indeed the body of Faulkner‟s literature is an imaginative 
journey into a remembered but dying Southern culture, of a people caught in the remembrance of 
a glory that was, in fact, an illusion in its own lifetime.  This literature strives to capture the 
echoes of memory that has become belief.  Another familiar metaphor in literature speaks of the 
mirror of memory that allows us to see ourselves as we were through the prism of what we have 
or have not become.  Even though selective or distorted, the insight of remembrance may be 
genuine. Honesty with oneself is no easy matter, however—no more in remembrance than any 
other human activity of self knowledge.  
 
V  
While our interest is in memory and mind, it is important to acknowledge that there is 
memory in the body as well. Quite apart from the miracle of the billions of neurons going about 
the extraordinary if routine tasks of monitoring thought, the body remembers to breathe; it 
remembers the motions which coordinate its movement. In healing a wound to its surface, it 
remembers how and when to stop the process of the repair of skin to make itself whole. The 
mind of memory, and the memory of mind are extensions into the assimilation of consciousness 
in terms of the logic of a natural process, whatever theory otherwise accounts for its operations. 
Memories come as they will, are internalized on their own logic. There is more than a fine 
difference between memory and memorizing: the latter is a matter of repetition until the recall of 
some face or figure or sound is imprinted.  Remembrance, on the other hand, is not in this way 
contrived but natural.  Numberless kinds of occasions and causes imprint on memory—
excitement, desire, fear, awe, and the many kinds of trauma that haunt human beings beyond the 
moment of the experience  
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Apart from the current of existence that is the backdrop of our lives individually and 
collectively, a special occurrence of remembrance sometimes comes to us as a gift.  It is as if 
something deep in us, in our past, a residual unrealized in our conscious and continuing life 
comes to presence in us and presents us with an uncanny insight that we have either forgotten, 
repressed, or did not consciously notice at its first occurrence.  Memory in this instance comes to 
disrupt the routine course of perception in our affairs and re-minds us of a possibility that has 
escaped us:  This is you: this is something you have been, or done, or felt…  It has the function 
of restoring to us a possibility of becoming something other than what we are tending to become.  
Something appears that has been missing.  Remembrance in this special addition is very much 
like dreams.  There is a need demanded on some level for the well being of the complex 
organism of the self; the function of the dream is in part to knit up the raveled sleeve of care, or 
in memory renew a resource that has fallen away. The restoration of possibility in what was lost 
may or may not come to conscious awareness, but the heart has reasons that are realized in the 
resource of dreams and memory. 
  This aspect of memory is celebrated in the ritual of commemoration; in the practice of 
birthdays, the observance of holidays.  Christian scripture expresses the healing of memory in the 
sacrament of the Eucharist: “…Do this in remembrance of me.”  There is a promise in such 
remembrance, not unlike the celebration of a birthday:  a reminder of the promise of a birth, of 
new life, a re-calling of the gift of life itself, which requires a waking and renewal from the 
routine wearing down of time and care.  Elegy and expressions in memoriam are parts of the 
process of grief and mourning, which like remorse, draw on memory to repair a tear in the fabric 
of consciousness, to bring the remembrance of a person or event to consciousness in order to 
align the pain of loss with the continuing energy of life.  
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Just as we are restored to a forgotten resource in our lives in the past, so are we invited to 
transcend whatever it is we have become in its absence.  The impulse of memory is not unlike a 
form of desire: this is what I was, and can be—the past comes to present in the promise of a 
future. The faculty of remembrance has a vital role in the process by which self-awareness, 
through reflection becomes self-understanding. Remembrance in this sense, becomes a 
mechanism for self-transformation where the past, experienced upon re-emergence, becomes a 
provocation—an instrument for cognitive change.  
This use of remembrance figures centrally in the art of fiction, both in the life of writers, 
and in the lives of their characters. While self-awareness is in an immediate sense automatic, it is 
also cumulative: as we reflect upon and make growth a matter of concern, habits become 
dispositions that, reinforced, become the character of the person, or the personality of the 
character in fiction.  But character becomes habituated to the presupposed and predictable, and in 
the routine of our lives we become locked into a self-image through the expectations of self and 
others. There are many ways in which this routine may be effectively altered—sometimes the 
course of our lives is shattered, sometimes merely adjusted in terms of some new erotically 
charged altercation.  In the poetry of fiction we are released into a world of imaginative 
remembrance—a window not simply to the lost fragments of past life, but to a field of creative 
possibility.  Remembrance serves in this way to restore possibility or otherwise reorient one to a 
continuing life in need of repair.  Sometimes, to go forward in our lives, we must regress, not 
merely to see what it is we have come through, but what in the ordinary of the past was 
significant in deciding what we have become.  We are enabled through remembrance to look 
along a line of development of past and future; at times deliberately taking stock, and judging 
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our judgments in retrospect we search in our past for some key to what we have become, to find 
some resource or insight that will make change possible. 
 Memory generally provides a residuum of affirmation through which poetry gives 
expression to transcendental possibility.   In the individual case, the poet takes the kernel of 
remembrance and gives life to its potential in images such that the poem becomes for the reader 
a crystallized memory. I experience the poem as if it were memory speaking.  “Recollected in 
tranquility” may be the particular watchword of Wordsworthian Romanticism, but there is a 
common appeal in poetry to the transcendental residuals of experience not used up in the 
ordinary affairs of life.  Whether tranquil or fevered, recollected or renovated, the poet 
consciously draws on an unconscious cauldron of energy available from the untapped resources 
of what the organism of the self has retained from the past.   
The cognitive occurrence of remembrance is a complex phenomenon employing a 
recollection and separate sense and investment in time and place, along with images drawn from 
that time and place.  I recall a trip I made with my son to celebrate his 16
th
 birthday, the hotel on 
the cliffs above Naples, sitting on the porch, Easter morning, he was still sleeping, and I 
remember his face in sleep, so like a infant or an angel, the spring morning alive with orange 
blossoms mixed with the smell of lemon trees, the bells begin to peal from the church far 
below…  I can walk into and through this experience as though it were a stage set, or as if I were 
once again alive in that time and place.  
We have seen that such a deliberate process, once initiated, may develop a life of its own.  
And so I now recall what led into the decision that the two of us would make the trip, the 
excitement and disappointments of being thrown together, my gradual realization of what a 
different person he had become, seeing myself in his anxieties…  Once I have located a time and 
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place, however deliberately, memory has a creative and independent logic that has to do not 
simply with a given time and place; on this occasion of regression it gathers together both prior 
and continuing concerns that make up my relation to my son.  The engaging of imagination in 
memory has limits such that I am drawn into the context of memory as an observer rather than 
participant, or rather, I suffer the memory, I do not command it.  The point at which I speak 
rather than listen in a particular occurrence of memory suggests that invention threatens to 
displace memory, which, even as a derivative activity, draws its energy from spontaneous 
imagination. 
 
VI 
Memory, like perception, is always a memory of something, and so characterized by 
intentionality. Not some thing, necessarily—it may be a time, or place, or event, or feeling, or 
person.  How is the content of remembrance different from that of perception or thought?  
Perception, of course is contextualized in present and continuing circumstances.  While thought 
generally is limited only by sense, memory seems to have additional contextual boundaries. 
A significant counterpoint of relevance exists in the relational ideas of the intentionality that key 
the insights of Husserl, and the idea of contextuality as it is central to Wittgenstein‟s analysis of 
meaningful experience.  Both play a crucial role in understanding memory.  In its 
phenomenological appearance memory has both mixed content and a split or doubled context.  
Meaning is discovered and recovered in remembrance both in its intention and the simultaneous 
experiencing of the context of present and past.  Patterns of association are further complicated 
by the feeling tones that accompany the experience.  Whether wandering in memory, as in the 
familiar sentimental song about taking a “sentimental journey,” or discovering a more intense 
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reminiscence in the Beetle‟s lyric of “Yesterdays,” thought follows sentience into moods of 
understanding and disclosure.  
In terms of intentional content, what I remember is…a place/ a person/ a feeling/ an 
event. In each case I focus on something distinct: in place, I can walk through it; in time, I can 
persist through it; in person, I can examine the features, character, face, shape of the body, grace 
of the carriage; in feeling, remembrance re-experiences specific emotions that bridge recent and 
remote times.  The problem with this analytic procedure is that it seems to make of memory a 
process no different in kind from what takes place under the directions: “Think of…”   or 
“Imagine that…” Examining the content or intent of remembering in an analytic frieze thus 
seems to lose an essential element that distinguishes it from thinking and imagining.  To correct 
this, it may be useful again to return to the analogy with madness.  Just as we may suffer the 
intrusion of remembrance in a way that breaks the consciousness of the moment, of the actual 
time and place of our continuing lives that we associated remotely but in kind with madness, so 
there an important comparison of the process of remembrance with the dream—in which one has 
a dream—the dream presents itself to consciousness on some level.  The importance of this very 
human faculty of remembrance may finally be, in any particular case, as with dreaming, not the 
detail of what we remember, but the fact that we remember. 
Memory functions in all these many ways to constitute and make possible who we are 
individually and collectively.  Insofar as we are human, i.e. persons with an identity, it makes 
possible that we are. In a deliberate act of remembrance—last night with my friends at the pub—
I recall not just what happened, who was there, what was said, I recall the meaning of what 
happened, the situation, actions and reactions of my friends—the occasion and what was made or 
not made of it.  Such focus is not only intentional, but interpretively so: I am searching and 
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sorting through what I can re-present, aware that there is something here to be understood, to be 
considered, to be assimilated toward a revision of my ongoing project of self and other, of life 
and world. 
 It is the same with the unwanted or gratuitous emergence of remembrance: I may or may 
not be surprised or troubled by this intrusion into consciousness of the past, this insistence of 
some sub-strata of mind that this particular thing of remembrance is important, but I can take an 
interest in it as a reminder, as a gift, as a warning, as a key to what is on the border of currency in 
my life.  We can learn to listen to memory, and here as elsewhere, Santayana‟s familiar after-
dinner reminder is worth a moment:  should we fail to listen to memory, we miss an invited 
moment in which our lives might take another turn, albeit for better or worse.  I am inclined to 
think “for better” in the sense that such emergence is not without meaning whether the organism 
itself requires this remembrance as a kind of updating or stabilizing of health (wholeness), or 
whether it is the soul that needs this resource for healing.   
 It is important, finally, to address the other side of all this, in the imperative of forgetting.  
Remembrance makes possible the identity of the person and of a people in the shifting 
occurrences of time and place, makes possible the continuing narrative of our life and lives, the 
self-life-writing of relational scripts for world and other.  But forgetting is also a critical moment 
in this process, for example in the simple feature that allows a renewal or continuance of 
consciousness without the encumbrance of all we assimilate. A further essential aspect to 
forgetting discussed by Ricoeur argues the need for the oblivion of forgetfulness to free the mind 
generally from the binding residuals of the past, and by Arendt in the context of political life that 
requires forgiving that we may begin again in the freedom of action. 
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We are, in fact, worth more than our acts. We are what we have done, and thought, and 
said—the totality of experience, that is, of consciousness, of memory.  But, as we have argued, 
memory exceeds consciousness at any given point.  Memory resides in the body and culture as 
well as in individual consciousness; it is inclusive of the unconscious and what may be operative 
and manifest in the life energy of desire and culture whether or not we are aware of it.  
Individually and collectively, we exceed the sum total of experience in that we can forget and 
forgive—give over to oblivion what would otherwise be held in consciousness and character, 
tradition and history.  It may be that residuals in some sense always remain, that although I can 
give up my resentment or hatred for what you did,  a trace always remains. Aristotle claimed as a 
point of moral autonomy no less than law that one may be blamed only for what he does, not for 
what he thinks or feels. Whatever we retain in active memory is a resource we dispose ourselves 
toward in terms of choice.   I may not choose the anger I feel at your betrayal, but I need not 
nurture it into resentment or hatred.  Nietzsche‟s idea of master morality is in part recognition of 
the possibility that we are not simply subject to memory, not simply organ stops with respect to 
experience.  We are not creatures condemned to resentiment. We can and do alter memory, as we 
filter experience, and this is our mastery which makes of morality something more than 
rationalization and habit. 
VII 
Within the structure of memory in Husserl‟s accounting and in addition to the autonomic 
feedback loops supportive of the ongoing current of existence, remembrance thus serves a 
creative resource of restoration and transformation.  There is a mending feature to remembrance 
in the process of reconciliation for example, that is critical for both identity and growth.  
Remembrance, coupled with the reciprocal movement of forgetting, or in the further movement 
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of forgiving, makes possible a revaluation of the whole life project.  This is a process of letting 
go in such a way that there is a deeper understanding and retention in memory, and a remediation 
through memory.  If it is impossible to remove the residuals of the trace, it is possible to revalue 
and reinscribe the tenor of a life-script.    
 Shoah is a point of remembrance without resolution in oblivion or forgiveness—it is 
simply and insistently a bearing witness to pain in memory.  The point however, is that there 
exists an option.  In individual and collective terms the residuals of memory require both 
retention and removal; they may be constructive or destructive; be that with which we learn and 
grow, or that from which we wither and die.  In the dynamic of memory, the reciprocity of 
retention and remediation must sometimes be attended by a deeper movement in which, e.g. 
remorse and guilt is transformed through forgiveness, so that one can begin again or be enabled 
to go on.  The adage attributed to Santayana, that those who fail to remember their past are 
doomed to fulfill it, is an additional reminder that we must both remember the past and somehow 
work through it to be freed of the consequences of its determination.  Both Freud and Derrida 
speak of the encumbrances of residuals in the trace of memory, and Ricoeur‟s analysis of the 
three modes of remembrance, history, and oblivion addresses at length the imperative of oblivion 
as a counter force against the chains of memory and history.  
Anger may be a simple matter of the moment—felt, acted upon, and forgotten.  But it 
may be retained and sour into hatred. Memory in this way becomes pathological: hatred is 
destructive of the subject, not its object.  Forgetting is a critical therapeutic issue here.  In the 
general course of individual and social development, remembering passes into history—natural, 
cultural, historical, individual—in ways that we are bound by it in habit and habituation, 
character and custom.  It is essential to the freedom of mind and spirit that there is an enabling 
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power of disengagement from the bounds and bonds of memory and history, the examples of 
which are legion.  Nietzsche analyzed the cultural foundation of traditional morality in terms of 
the negative trace of memory in resentiment and Shakespeare makes the more general point 
without cultural moralizing in Hamlet‟s remark: “Thus doth conscience make cowards of us 
all,”—both of which suggest the scope of this difficulty.  The psychoanalytic focus on the 
negative aspects of memory in the forming of pathology through anxiety, guilt, resentment, 
remorse and shame indicate as well the need for a creative faculty that integrates the reciprocity 
of selective remembrance and forgetting.  
The savage energies of war generate an intensity of feeling that often carries into 
indelible memory.  In the violence of action, life becomes meaningful in ways hard to relinquish 
in its aftermath, so that its carnage for both perpetrator and victim remain long after the offense. 
Reconciliation with self and other, in and after war, requires more than forgetting. The political 
instrument of general amnesty as a kind of formal and public forgetting is exemplary: there is 
always a trace of remembrance written on the soul of a person and a people, such that more than 
a political act is required for reconciliation, for a healing of the self in relation to the other.  If 
forgetting ensured oblivion, it would be ideal: the terrible sense of the other as alien, an object of 
fear and loathing simply deleted from living memory.  But the deeper healing of reconciliation 
that makes community possible seems to require a middle ground that includes remembrance as 
well.  A spiritual sense of wholeness and a democracy of cultural sensibility cannot be legislated 
by government. 
It is at just this point that the world of literature, art, and music transcends times and 
cultures  to become a mode of translation and transformation, of recognition and redemption.  
The most obvious example of this is found in tragic drama, which identifies suffering as 
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universal; it creates a space in which we can identify with and take on the suffering of the other. 
The Greek writing and viewing of The Trojan Women is one example that Martha Nussbaum has 
examined.  The drama is far removed from the aftermath of a mythic war, of course, and written 
in Greek for Greeks, but the transforming point of reconciliation in the imaginative use of 
memory is still in force.  Another familiar example of humanity in the remembrance of the other 
in literature is found in the memorable episode in the war-poem of the Iliad, in which man-
slaying Hector, taking off his war helmet at the frightened cry of his child, comforts him in an 
unquestionable and intimate moment of humanity.  Remarque‟s novel All Quiet on The Western 
Front, is another familiar example of an expression of humanity with which any side of a 
conflict can identify, and through this recognition of a common humanity, find reconciliation 
with the other. 
It is not hard to envision what Man would be in the absence of the faculty of 
remembering or of an interest in the preservation of memory.  There would be neither character 
nor culture, creatures living only from moment to moment with no thought of either past or 
future.  It is in this way of course that the idea of future exists only in the conception of the past.  
The assimilative character of consciousness is rooted in the background connectedness of the 
moments of its lived-time, and the fact that the moment just past is still retained as part of the 
living structure of the present.  Husserl‟s three modes of consciousness: primal impression 
(consciousness as such); retention (original consciousness of past that preserves and modifies the 
just lapsed phases of the object), and protention (immediate consciousness of the future phases 
of the object as possibility) together constitute perception, memories, and strivings, a 
phenomenology of time consciousness as a flow of continuous moments of past-present-future. 
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Both world and person exist in this continuous flow of duration: that we have a past, makes the 
conception of the future—of a different and better life.—possible.  However difficult things are, 
we remember that times can be better and find therein the resources for making them so—thus 
springs hope and a strength of endurance. 
 
Concluding Note 
 I had in mind to reference and analyze the importance of remembrance though various 
literary works, but that must await a further writing.  In addition to Faulkner and Elliot cited at 
the outset, and aside from the obvious and usual inclusion of writers like Proust (On the 
Remembrance of Things Past), it would be instructive to contrast remembrance in writers such as  
Conrad (Youth, Heart of Darkness), Dostoevsky (Letters from Underground),  Joyce (Dubliners, 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man), Thomas Wolff (Look Homeward Angel), Nabokov (Speak 
Memory), and lighter pieces like Harold Pinter‟s Old Times, among many others that you might 
recall as well. 
 Aristotle cited the remembrance of great words and deeds as that which makes possible 
the history and identity of a people.  Marx‟s  analysis of man as a species-being whose identity is 
a product of his history—what he makes, what he does, what he incorporates into the memory of 
his constructive achievements—also speaks to the essential importance of cultural memory.  But 
it is in the transcendental character of remembrance in art and literature that human beings 
become conscious of and reconciled to the essential strangeness as well as possibilities of a 
shared and common world.   
The wonder of invitation in human life is to think, to dream, to remember, to imagine.  
We began with the metaphor of journey to describe the life of memory.  The metaphor of journey 
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is also essential to an understanding of human life as such. T.S. Elliot expresses in poetry the 
argument of Plato about life and learning: that all human strivings may result in returning to the 
place where we began, and of recognizing it for the first time.  Remembrance is an essential 
modality in the journey of recognition and realization that leads us to ourselves, which is the 
crucial point of Plato‟s reminder that philosophy is coming to understand what it is we already 
know. 
Heidegger‟s lesson in the repair of humanity that envisions truth as aletheia as 
unforgetting— is also a remembrance that brings to presence that from which we have fallen 
away—most of all that we have fallen away from ourselves, from the being of the becoming 
which we are.  But essential to the correction of forgetfulness is the reciprocal dynamic and 
existential dialectic that joins remembering and forgetting: both are essential in the mind‟s 
freedom and identity and to its outreach to world and other.  The contribution of poetic literature 
to this constituting of self and world is the collective idea of humanity in which presence and 
absence exist each in the other so that the mind of memory is discovered already in the shared 
world of culture, in the living tradition that binds experience into the possibility of the moral life 
of human beings. 
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